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 I. Introduction 
 A capital inflow represents an increase in the demand for a country's assets--in the 
absence of policy intervention, the currency tends to appreciate.  Yet, most of the developing 
countries that received sizable capital inflows during the first half of 1990s have, in varying 
degrees, resisted a nominal exchange rate appreciation.  This reluctance to allow market forces 
to take their course and appreciate the domestic currency stems from a variety of reasons:  the 
authorities' explicit commitment (or the less explicit desire) to maintain a fixed exchange rate; 
a general perception that the inflows are a temporary phenomenon; an attempt to prevent or 
delay a real exchange rate appreciation (so as to maintain international competitiveness); or a 
combination of these motives.  Another prominent and widespread concern among policy 
circles, that has provided the grounds for some form of policy intervention, has been that 
nature of these cross-border financial flows tends to be dominantly short-term and, often, 
volatile.  These "hot money" features could add to the vulnerability of the financial sector, 
particularly if the banking system is playing a dominant role in intermediating these flows. 
 These multiple concerns have led policymakers in countries experiencing a surge in 
capital inflows to react by actively implementing a spectrum of policies (see Calvo, 
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993 and 1994), Schadler et. al (1993), and Montiel (1995)).   The 
policy menu has been highly varied: 
 Fiscal austerity measures, particularly on the spending side, have been implemented to 
alleviate some of the pressures on the real exchange rate and to cool down an overheating 
economy.  The effectiveness of fiscal measures in easing the pressure on the real exchange rate 
would be magnified if fiscal expenditure falls heavily on nontraded goods.  Furthermore, fiscal 
surpluses can help "sterilize" the expansive monetary effects of foreign exchange purchases.   
 Trade liberalization has been accelerated in some cases; the idea being that the ensuing 
efficiency gains would eventually increase international competitiveness and lead to an 
improvement in the current account.i  Further, productivity gains in the nontraded sector could 
also dampen pressures on the real exchange rate.  Over the short run, reducing the distortions 
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associated with controls on trade may temporarily widen the current account deficit--
effectively absorbing some of the inflows without boosting domestic demand. 
 Liberalization of capital outflows has also been a popular response to rising capital 
inflows.  By permitting domestic residents to hold foreign assets, the conventional wisdom 
holds, gross outflows would increase and net inflows would decline (see Labán and Larraín 
(1994)).   
 Various forms of controls on capital inflows, whether in the form of taxes, quantitative 
restrictions, or in the guise of "prudential measures" toward the financial sector have also been 
implemented; most of these measures were aimed at deterring short-term inflows.  In addition, 
(as argued by Budnevich and Cifuentes (1993)) by imposing these capital controls some 
measure of short-run monetary independence is gained even in relatively rigid exchange rate 
regimes.   
 Revaluation of the nominal exchange rate has also been resorted to, particularly as it 
became evident that the inflows were persistent and curtailing the monetary expansion 
associated with the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves became increasingly difficult 
and costly.  Furthermore, if a real exchange rate appreciation is to take place, it is preferable 
that the adjustment comes via the exchange rate rather than through higher domestic inflation. 
 Greater exchange rate flexibility has also been a part of the menu of policy responses 
to the rising capital inflows.  As in the case of a revaluation, it allows the adjustment to take 
place through the nominal exchange rate rather than through prices.  However, unlike discrete 
revaluations in the context of an exchange rate peg or a crawl, it increases the independence of 
the domestic monetary authorities and it introducing and/or increasing short-run exchange rate 
risk.  The presence of (or increase in) such risk, it is argued, would act as a deterrent to short-
term speculative inflows.   
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 Less conventional measures that have aimed to curb consumer credit and 
consumption activity have also been part of the packege of "countercyclical" policies in a 
number of countries. 
 However, the policy most often resorted to, across countries and across time, in response 
to the surge in capital inflows in recent years has been sterilized intervention.ii  To avoid 
some (or all) of the nominal exchange rate appreciation that would have resulted from the 
capital inflow, the monetary authorities have intervened in varying degrees in the foreign 
exchange market.  The result of that intervention was an accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves.  To offset some or all of the monetary expansion associated with the purchase of 
foreign exchange, the monetary authorities have most often opted to conduct open market sales 
of treasury bills or central bank paper), increase reserve requirements (see Reinhart and 
Reinhart (1995), shift government deposits (or other such funds) from the banking system to 
the central bank, or a combination of these actions.  Most countries have relied on several of 
these options. 
 We have now witnessed more than half a decade of relatively heavy capital inflows to a 
large group of highly heterogeneous developing countries and economies in transition in Asia, 
Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, Latin America, and parts of Africa and the Middle 
East--we have also witnessed the broad range of policy responses that these inflows have 
elicited.  In light of this, the aim of this paper is threefold: first, we take stock of which 
countries implemented which policies; second, we attempt to assess to what extent the policies 
achieved their intended objectives; lastly, we draw lessons about which policies appear to have 
been the most successful tool in coping with surging capital inflows, with emphasis on the 
"policy mix" and how they interact. 
 Since sterilized intervention is the most universal policy response, the next section 
reviews the extensive country experiences with the use of this policy and the varied forms it 
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has taken; its impact on interest rates, spreads, and the level and composition of capital flows is 
discussed.  Exchange rate policy is considered next.  The discussion in Section III focuses on 
two policies: a realignment of the exchange rate while maintaining the prevailing exchange 
rate regime and a change in the exchange rate regime altogether.  The fiscal policy response to 
rising capital flows, as well as the implications it has for the conduct of monetary policy, are 
covered in the next Section while Section V focusses on policies that affect the capital account, 
such as the liberalization of capital outflows and policies to discourage inflows.  Issues related 
to the interaction and sequencing of these policies and the key lessons are addressed in the 
final section.  
 
 II.  Monetary Policy:  Sterilized Intervention 
 The aims of sterilized intervention are twofold.  In intervening in the foreign exchange 
market a nominal exchange rate appreciation is avoided.  Meanwhile, efforts to sterilize that 
intervention usually stem from a desire to avoid the monetary expansion that would otherwise 
ensue from the central bank's accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.  Sterilized 
intervention may also influence the exchange rate by "signaling" policy intentions (aee, for 
instance, Mussa (1981)).  However, despite the fact that sterilization efforts have been so 
numerous and often quite prolonged, relatively little has been said about the impact these 
policies have had on domestic interest rates (either their level or their variability), monetary 
growth, and the volume and composition of capital flows.  
 Some recent studies have examined empirically whether there is scope for sterilization 
policies at all, since under perfect capital mobility and when assets are perfect substitutes 
sterilization is altogether ineffective (unless the signalling channel is significant).iii  Some 
studies have concluded that in most of the developing countries examined there is some scope 
for sterilization policies in the short-run (i.e. changes in domestic credit are not instantaneously 
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offset by changes in net foreign assets).iv   Other studies have found stronger evidence of high 
capital mobility in a number of the developing countries that have experienced heavy capital 
inflows, thus casting greater doubts on their ability to sterilize at all (see Frankel (1994a)).  In 
either case, the net conclusion is that there appears to be little room for sterilization policies on 
a sustained basis. 
 Frankel (1994b) focused on the effects of sterilization policies and analyzes under which 
conditions sterilization of capital inflows could result in a rise in domestic interest rates and in 
which instances sterilization simply prevents domestic interest rates from converging to 
international levels.  For instance, domestic interest rates would rise if the domestic currency 
assets investors want to hold (i.e. bank CDs, stocks, bonds) are poor substitutes for short-term 
central bank paper or treasury bills being supplied by the central bank.  To induce investors to 
hold the increased supply of short-term paper, the price of this paper has to decline and yields 
increase.  Another reason why interest rates could rise is if there is an increase in the demand 
for money due to, say, a successful reduction in inflation and/or a higher level of income.  By 
sterilizing, the monetary authorities are not accommodating the increased demand for money 
and, hence, forcing the money market to clear at a higher interest rate.  Calvo (1991) stresses 
the potential quasi-fiscal losses associated with sterilization, as the central bank acquires 
relatively low-yield foreign exchange reserves and issues high-yield sterilization bonds.  
Focusing on the experience of Colombia in 1991, a recent study cautioned that large-scale 
sterilization policies could backfire by leading to higher domestic short-term interest rates, 
wider differentials vís-a-vís international interest rates, and promoting further inflows of short-
term capital (see Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993)).  It is, of course, risky to make 
generalizations about the effects of sterilization from a single episode.  Hence, to better 
understand the effects of sterilization policies and gauge their success in achieving their goals, 
it is useful to systematically review the experience of a diverse range of countries.    
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 The remainder of this section fills that gap by analyzing the recent experience of several 
countries where sterilized intervention was a central policy response to the surge in capital 
inflows.  The focus is on episodes where the timing of the policy changes is relatively well-
defined.  However, since sterilization policies, broadly defined, have taken a variety of forms it 
is necessary to have a preliminary description of the various forms sterilization has taken in the 
selected group of countries.v  Specifically, we consider three types of sterilization policies:  
open market operations, reserve requirement changes, and the management of government 
deposits.  The relative merits and when and where these measures were employed will be 
discussed in turn. 
1. Open market operations 
 Sterilization through open market operations has usually meant that the central bank 
sells either government securities, such as treasury bills, or its own paper.  Mexico, for 
instance, carried out its sterilization policies through central bank sales of government debt, 
such as CETES and TESOBONOS.  However, in many countries, including Chile, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines, the central bank issued its own debt for the purposes of 
conducting open market operations.  In some instances, (Malaysia and Sri Lanka), open market 
operations were initially conducted by selling public sector debt, but as the central bank 
depleted its own holdings of government debt, either because of the large scale of the 
sterilization effort and/or because new issuance dwindled as public finances were consolidated, 
the central bank also began to auction its own debt as well (Table 1). 
 It has been argued that the main advantage of sterilization through open market 
operations is that they offer a viable way of curtailing the monetary/credit expansion without 
imposing a heavier tax burden on the banking system and inducing financial disintermediation, 
as is the case with increased reserve requirements (see Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 
(1994)).  The main disadvantages are that it may entail sizable central bank costs even in a 
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relatively short period of time.vi  Further, such sterilization efforts may increase the 
domestic/international interest rate spread sufficiently so as to end up attracting more short-
term capital.  However, despite these drawbacks sterilization policies may be a viable policy 
response, particularly if there are concerns that the banking system is not capable of adequately 
intermediating capital inflows and/or the inflows are perceived to be temporary. 
 The intensity of these policies has varied considerably across countries and across time 
(see Table 1).  Chile during the first half of 1990, Colombia in most of 1991, Indonesia during 
1991-92, Malaysia from mid-1991 through early 1993, and Sri Lanka 1991-92, all represent 
episodes of attempts to conduct open market operations on a scale so as to almost fully sterilize 
the capital inflows.vii  Chile mid-1991 to the present, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, and 
Thailand are cases where sterilization has been used throughout much of the inflow episode to 
sterilize a portion the inflows.  For example, during 1993, the year when capital inflows 
peaked, Mexico sterilized about 25 percent of the inflows.viii  
2. Reserve requirements 
 The manipulation of reserve requirements, so as to achieve a reduction in the money 
multiplier and curtail the monetary expansion associated with the central bank intervention in 
the foreign exchange market, has also taken a variety of forms.  Some countries have opted to 
simply increase the  statutory reserve requirement on all domestic currency deposits.  Leading 
examples of this policy are Costa Rica, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.  At the start of the inflow 
episode in 1989 Malaysia's statutory reserve requirement was 3.5 percent, by early 1994 it had 
been increased in multiple steps to 11.5 percent (Table 2).  Other countries (Colombia 1991) 
imposed high marginal reserve requirements.  In several countries where banks receive foreign 
currency deposits, Chile, Peru and Sri Lanka, reserve requirements on these accounts were 
either imposed for the first time or increased.  While this latter measure does not affect the 
narrow-money multiplier (M1), it reduces the expansion in the broader aggregates.  In some 
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countries, financial sector reform and liberalization took place during or shortly before the 
large inflows of capital and this process led to reductions in reserve requirements.  For 
example, in April 1989 Mexico eliminated reserve requirements and these were replaced by a 
30 percent liquidity ratio, which could be held in the form of interest-bearing government 
paper.ix  Argentina also had reductions in reserve requirements during the inflow period.  In the 
case of the Philippines, the Bangko Central announced a reduction in reserve requirements in 
August 1994 with the objective of inducing a decline in domestic interest rates, so as to narrow 
the domestic/international interest rate spread and reduce capital inflows (see Alfiler (1994)). 
 Since reserve requirements are a tax on the banking system, and since banks are likely to 
pass on all or a part of the tax to its clients, an interesting issue is to see if the higher tax is 
passed on to depositors or to borrowers.  If its the former, it lowers domestic deposit rates and 
acts as a disincentive to capital inflows.  If, alternatively, it increases lending rates, it is a 
further inducement for firms to borrow abroad, thus may wind up stimulating further inflows.   
 While the issue is an empirical one, it appears that in the majority of cases considered 
here it is mostly the lending rates that adjust.  Hence, as with open market operations its impact 
on capital flows may run in the opposite direction of what was intended.  Further, if 
disintermediation occurs, and transactions increasingly take place in other financial institutions 
which are not subject to the requirements, a reserve requirement change may not produce the 
desired effect.x   These nonbank institutions may also have the unappealing feature that they 
may be more difficult to supervise and regulate. 
3. Management of government deposits and of the funds 
 Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand have all at various times 
followed a policy of shifting the deposits of the public sector and/or pension funds from the 
banking system to the central bank (Table 3).xi   In the case of Mexico, during 1991 the 
Mexican government also placed the proceeds of its privatizations in the central bank.   
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 If these deposits are counted as part of the money stock then the transfer to the central 
bank works in the same way as an increase in reserve requirements (as the reserve requirement 
on those deposits is effectively increased to 100 percent).  If the deposits are not counted as 
part of the money stock, then the shift is more akin to a liquidity-draining open market 
operation with the difference that the central bank may not have to pay a market rate of interest 
on its deposits as it would on its sterilization bonds.  This mode of sterilization has several 
advantages.  It does not constitute a tax on the banking system, nor does it appear to increase 
short-term interest rates as much as sales of sterilization bonds often do.  If the deposits are not 
renumerated, there is no quasi-fiscal cost; if they are renumerated at below-market interest 
rates, there is a quasi-fiscal cost, but it is below the cost if open market operations had been 
used.xii  However, large and unforeseen deposit withdrawals could complicate banks' cash 
management.  In addition, to the extent that some of the funds are not public sector deposits 
but along the lines of Malaysia's Employee Provident Fund (EPF) or Singapore's Central 
Provident Fund (CPF), the cost of these policies is paid by those who contribute to the fund; it 
is a form of financial repression.  Lastly, such policies may be limited in scope by the 
availability of the eligible funds.  For instance, government deposits held at the Bank of 
Thailand increased from 25 percent of total deposits at the end of 1987 to 82 percent in mid-
1992, suggesting the scope for further manoeuver may be limited. 
4. Effects on interest rates, spreads, and capital flows 
 As noted earlier, there are several distinct and well-defined episodes of intensive 
sterilization efforts which may offer an opportunity to gauge what some of the macroeconomic 
effects of these policies are.  The main episodes examined include:  Chile during the first half 
of 1990; Colombia in most of 1991; Indonesia during 1991-92; Malaysia from mid-1991 
through early 1993.  A number of empirical regularities characterize the episodes. 
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 First, in all cases there is a particularly marked accumulation of international reserves, 
suggesting a great degree of central bank intervention in order to avoid or mitigate an 
exchange rate appreciation (Chart 1).  
 Second, despite the heavy foreign exchange intervention by the central banks, in all 
cases either the rate of devaluation slows down, or there is a revaluation (Malaysia).  These 
two observations jointly, attest to the large orders of magnitudes of the inflows (Chart 2). 
 Third, reflecting the heavy open market operations, issuance of central bank notes 
increases dramatically (in both absolute terms and relative to the monetary base) in a relatively 
short period of time.  In the case of Colombia the ratio of open market paper to the monetary 
base increases from less than 30 percent in late 1990 to over 80 percent by October 1991.  In 
Chile that ratio rises by more than 100 percent in a period of six months.  In Indonesia, there is 
a similar surge in outstanding Bank Indonesia Certificates (see Chart 3).  In Malaysia, where 
the central bank was selling treasury bills and Bank Negara Bills (BNB), as well as borrowing 
heavily in the interbank market, a more comprehensive indicator of the sterilization effort is 
required.  Chart 3 presents such a broad measure of central bank liquidity operations.  In 1990, 
during the first year of heavy inflows, Bank Negara increased liquidity by US$6.5 billion; by 
1993 the last year of the heavy sterilization effort (capital controls were imposed at the 
beginning of 1994), Bank Negara was draining liquidity at a rate of US$40.3 billion a year. 
 Fourth, in all four episodes domestic short-term interest rose as the sterilization efforts 
got underway.  This rise in short-term rates also materializes during sterilization efforts in 
Korea (1988-89), Sri Lanka (1992-93), and the Philippines (1992-93:IH).xiii  The increase 
occurs despite heavy capital inflows, which other things equal would have tended to drive the 
domestic interest rate lower.  In addition, in several of these countries (including Chile and 
Colombia) the country risk premia appear to be declining during these episodes, which other 
things equal, should also allow for lower domestic interest rate.xiv  Table 4 summarizes the 
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evolution of interest rates before, during, and after the sterilization period.  As Table 4 
highlights, the rise in interest rates was often quite pronounced and, given the reduced rate of 
devaluation (or in the case of Malaysia an appreciation), the rise in ex-post dollar interest rates 
is even greater (Table 4).  As noted earlier, imperfect asset substitutability may be a plausible 
explanation.  The increased investor demand may fall on corporate bonds and equities, which 
may be poor substitutes for the short-term paper (or short-term treasuries) being supplied in 
increasing quantities by the central bank.  In addition, given that the capital inflows usually 
coincided with a period of stronger economic activity (and, in some instances, declining 
inflation), it is not implausible to suppose that there was an increase in money demand.  Hence, 
there was an unintended overshooting in the tightening of monetary policy.  In any case, 
interest rates fell when sterilization policies were abandoned. 
 Fifth, and following from the previous observation, ex-post interest rate spreads (in 
dollars), which in the case of Malaysia had fallen with the initial wave of inflows, were kept 
high by the sterilization policies, suggesting that the policy response does have an impact, at 
least in the short run, in determining whether and how quickly domestic interest rates converge 
to international levels.xv  In all these cases, domestic short-term interest rate spreads remained 
relatively high to those of, say, Argentina, which did not undertake any form of sterilization 
(Chart 4).  It appears, then, that the lesser the extent of sterilization, the quicker that domestic 
interest rates "converge" to international levels.  However, it is worth noting, that the monetary 
authorities ability to affect domestic interest rates and effectively control the money supply 
appears to erode over time.xvi  Indeed this conclusion seems to run through many of the case 
studies on these countries (see Alfilier (1994), Aziz (1994), Harinowo and Belchere (1994), 
Hettiarachchi and Herat (1994), and Rodriguez (1991)).  In all four cases considered, 
sterilization policies were either abandoned altogether, scaled back, or complemented by 
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capital controls, as it became evident that the high domestic interest rates were attracting more 
inflows.   
 Lastly, in addition to attracting further short-term flows of funds, the rise in short-term 
interest rates (and interest rate differentials)  associated with sterilized intervention if sustained 
for a sufficient period, may dampen investment demand with the cost of capital increasing 
while returns on less risky assets (such as on government paper) are rising.  As a consequence, 
investment in financial assets might increase relative to investment in plant and equipment.  
Thus, sterilized intervention could encourage a shift in the composition of capital inflows away 
from long-term to short-term flows.   
 The experiences of several countries, with shifts in the size and composition of capital 
flows in response to sterilization policies are illustrated in Charts 5-9.xvii   Argentina is 
included in the sample for comparison purposes since it is the one country that did not sterilize 
at all.  As noted above, several of the rapidly growing economies in Southeast Asia (notably 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand; Charts 5,6, and 7) in the late 1980s experienced dramatic 
increases in capital inflows which contributed to upward pressure on their exchange rates and 
eventually to potential overheating of their economies.  As a result of the sterilization policies 
pursued, in all three countries, interest differentials rose sharply in 1990, inducing large 
inflows of short-term capital.  With the interest differential narrowing as policy was eased and 
the exchange rate allowed to appreciate, short-term inflows to Thailand slacked off in 1991-
92.xviii   While in Indonesia the interest differential widened further in 1991-92, short-term 
capital inflows declined reflecting in part steps taken by the government to limit short-term 
foreign borrowing by public sector enterprises and new limits imposed on the open foreign 
currency positions of the commercial banks.  In Malaysia, short-term inflows continued to rise 
in 1991-92 as the interest differential widened further.  After 1991, the authorities reduced 
their intervention and allowed the exchange rate to appreciate.  Despite a narrowing of the 
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differential in 1993, short-term inflows rose, and the authorities moved in early 1994 to impose 
capital controls.  In Chile (Chart 8), a sharp rise in the interest rate differential in 1989-90 
contributed to a surge in short-term capital inflows.  With the differential narrowing in 1991, 
short-term inflows subsided somewhat, before picking up again in 1992 as the differential 
widened and falling in 1993 as it narrowed.xix  Argentina over the period 1989-92 (Chart 9) 
faced a widening interest differential and a reversal of short-term capital flows from sizable 
outflows in 1989 to significant inflows in 1992 following the introduction of the currency 
board or "Convertibility Plan" in April 1991.  In the absence of sterilization policies, interest 
rates converged to world levels, the interest rate differential leveled out as did short-term 
capital inflows in 1993. 
 In all of these countries, short-term flows as a share of total capital inflows rose at least 
initially in response to sterilization of intervention.  There does not appear, however, to have 
been any pronounced or sustained shift in the composition of capital inflows as a result of such 
intervention, owing possibly to the fact that the periods of sterilization were relatively brief or 
that other mitigating factors (principally those influencing foreign direct investment behavior) 
were present.   
 
 III.  Exchange Rate Policy 
 Rising capital inflows have tended to appreciate the nominal exchange rate.  However, 
as discussed, the monetary authorities have often opted for an active intervention strategy so as 
to limit or avoid the nominal appreciation.  The extent of intervention was, in turn, reflected in 
a large accumulation of international reserves in most of these countries (Charts 1 and 5-9), but 
as the inflows persisted and sterilization policies became more costly and/or more difficult to 
implement several countries opted to allow their currencies to respond more to market forces 
by either a discrete revaluation, increased exchange rate flexibility, or as in the cases of Chile 
 - 14 - 
 
 
and Colombia a combination of both.  The remainder of this section reviews two related issues. 
 First, it discusses the relative merits of allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility as a 
response to increasingly large international capital movements.  Second, it reviews the 
experiences with these policies for a number of capital-importing countries.  
1. Revaluation 
 An appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in response to increased demand for 
domestic assets can take place without the need for any policy action in more flexible 
exchange rate regimes.  However, if the prevailing arrangement is one where the rate is set by 
the authorities (i.e. peg, crawling peg, narrow band), then, at some point, a decision has to be 
made whether a realignment will be undertaken.  There are several advantages to allowing the 
nominal exchange rate to appreciate during periods of heavy capital inflows (see Calvo, 
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1994)).  First, it insulates the money supply, domestic credit, and the 
banking system from the inflows; this is particularly desirable if the inflows are perceived to 
be of a highly reversible nature.  If banking supervision is weak and there are inefficiencies in 
pricing risk, there may be additional reasons to limit banks' role in intermediating the capital 
inflows.  Second, if the economic "fundamentals" warrant a real exchange rate appreciation, 
the adjustment comes via the exchange rate and not via higher inflation.  Third, and related to 
the previous point, because of a pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices, an 
appreciation may help reduce inflation.  
 Despite the advantages of allowing the exchange rate to adjust to changing market 
conditions, revaluations have been a relatively uncommon response to surging capital inflows 
(hence the prevalence of sterilized intervention policies).  Chile and Colombia are the two 
examples where revaluations have been a part of the policy response and even there, the 
realignment was sought only after it became evident that the inflows and the exchange rate 
pressures were more persistent than initially believed.  Between April 1991 and June 1991 
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Chile's band was revalued by a cumulative 3.4 percent (Table 5).  Larger revaluations followed 
in January 1992 (5 percent) and November 1994 (9.5 percent) as the exchange rate became 
persistently stuck to the bottom of the band.xx   A similar pattern emerged in Colombia, where 
a crawling peg system had been in place for about 25 years (see Carrasquilla (1995)).  Still 
within the context of a peg, the exchange rate was revalued by 2.6 percent in June 1991.  The 
more substantial realignments occured much later in 1994 (5 and 7 percent in January and 
November respectively), in the context of the newly established exchange rate band. 
2. Greater exchange rate flexibility 
 Over and beyond the reasons given above for allowing the exchange rate to adjust in 
response to a shift in capital flows, there are other motives for allowing the exchange rate to 
fluctuate more freely in the presence of large capital inflows.  First, it introduces some 
uncertainty that may well discourage some of the purely speculative (and highly reversible) 
inflows.  Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1994) argue, in the context of a two-country model, that 
an increase in exchange rate uncertainty creates a bias toward the domestic asset, dampens the 
sensitivity of the current account to most types of shocks, and reduces net capital flows.  
Indeed, the higher uncertainty acts similarly to a Tobin tax.  In the event of capital outflows, 
the greater flexibility takes some of the pressure off foreign exchange reserves.  Second, it 
grants the monetary authorities a greater degree of independence and permits them to exercise 
more control over the monetary aggregates. 
 The main disadvantage of a pure float is that massive capital flows may induce steep and 
abrupt movements in the real exchange rate, which, in turn, may impose a substantial 
adjustment burden on the economy.  In particular, the concern in many countries has been that 
real appreciation will harm  strategic sectors of the economy, like the nontraditional export 
sector.  If the inflows are temporary and if there are hysteresis effects on exports from the real 
exchange rate appreciation, there may be reasons for avoiding or dampening the real exchange 
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rate adjustment (see Krugman (1987)).  Some empirical evidence, (see, for instance, Grobar 
(1993)) suggests that greater real exchange rate volatility may have negative effects on 
tradable-goods sectors.  This result may be due to the existence of incomplete markets, to the 
extent that financial markets do not provide enough instruments to hedge against such 
uncertainty. 
 There is a wide degree of cross-country variation in the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility among the capital importing countries.  While some countries, such as Peru and the 
Philippines have a float, the common ground appears to be that all central banks intervene in 
the foreign exchange market to some degree and no country has operated under a pure float.  
Among the Asian countries Indonesia widened its intervention band twice (Table 6) and 
Malaysia and the Philippines have allowed greater variability in the exchange rate, particularly 
since 1992 (See Table 7).  Korea intends to further widen the margins for daily exchange rate 
fluctuations, with the aim of moving toward a free float in two to three years.xxi  Among the 
Latin American countries, Chile, Mexico and more recently Colombia have allowed some 
degree of exchange rate flexibility in the context of their exchange rate bands.  Both Chile and 
Mexico widened their bands (Table 6 provides details), and especially in Chile the exchange 
rate has been allowed to extensively fluctuate within the band.xxii    
 However, as Table 7 highlights, despite announcements of wider bands, the variance of 
monthly exchange rates in some of these countries showed little change.  The variance of 
monthly exchange rates in Indonesia, for example, did not change after the band was widened 
twice in 1994.  Similarly, during 1992 and 1993 and most of 1994 the variance of the Mexican 
peso remained about the same as it was when the exchange rate was fixed (i.e. nil) and about 
the same as Argentina's exchange rate under the Convertibility plan.  This pattern is also 
evident in the daily data (see Chart 10).  By contrast, there was a marked jump in the variance 
of the exchange rate in Colombia after the introduction of the band in January 1994 and a more 
 - 17 - 
 
 
moderate, but nonetheless noticeable increase in exchange rate variance in the case of 
Malaysia.  
 It is difficult to assess conclusively whether the greater variability (and therefore the 
greater short-run uncertainty) in the exchange rate was successful in deterring short-term flows 
even in the cases where the variance changes considerably.  In the case of Chile, where short-
term flows as a proportion of total flows have declined, there were other impediments to short-
term inflows (i.e. capital controls).xxiii  In the case of Colombia, where the composition of 
flows show a similar pattern to Chile's, the introduction of the band coincides with the 
imposition of a tax on short-term borrowing making it difficult to isolate the effects of 
individual policies.  For Malaysia, the effects of increased exchange rate variability may have 
been offset by tight money policies which, as argued in the previous section, kept short-term 
domestic interest rates above world levels. 
 
 IV.  Fiscal Policies 
 Another policy reaction to capital inflows has been to tighten fiscal policy either by 
reducing expenditure, increasing taxes, or both (Table 8).  The idea is to use fiscal restraint so 
as to lower aggregate demand and curb the potentially inflationary impact of capital inflows.  
There are likely to be, however, important differences in the macroeconomic effects of how the 
fiscal gap is closed.  For instance, if government expenditure is more heavily weighted toward 
the nontraded good than private expenditure, then a cut in government spending may be a more 
effective way of alleviating pressures on the real exchange rate than heavier taxation of the 
private sector.  Further, if consumer credit is readily available, as it usually is during periods of 
heavy capital inflows, the greater availability of financing may compensate for the reduction in 
disposable income. This is particularly so if the tax is perceived as temporary.  However, a 
contraction of government expenditure is always a sensitive political issue and it can not be 
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undertaken on short notice.  Such delays increase the risk that, ex-post, the policy is 
procyclical.  Further, fiscal policy is usually set on the basis of medium or long-term 
considerations, such as infrastructure and social spending needs, rather than in response to 
what may turn out to be short-term fluctuations in international capital movements (Bercuson 
and Koenig (1993)).  
 The clearest example of fiscal restraint a key policy response to capital inflows the 
capital inflow is Thailand, particularly during 1988-91 (see also Schadler et. al. (1993) and 
Nijathaworn and Dejthamrong (1994)).  A combination of moderation of government 
expenditure, a strong cyclical improvement in revenues (real GDP growth averaged 11.3 
percent during 1988-91).  The government budgetary balance (as a percent of GDP) swings 
from a deficit of 1.4 percent to a surplus of 4.9 percent in 1991.  However, as noted, there may 
be a tradeoff for fiscal policy between the medium or long-term goals and short-run 
considerations.  Thailand provides an example of this policy dilemma.  The booming growth of 
the economy has generated a need to improve the country's infrastructure (which is no longer 
adequate if rapid growth is to be sustained).  At the same time, the pressures on the real 
exchange rate that accompany the surge in inflows could warrant fiscal restraint, particularly if 
no other substantive macroeconomic measures are being implemented to deal with the inflow.  
However, infrastructure bottlenecks are not exclusive to Thailand; Malaysia, which has had an 
average growth rate of above 8 percent for seven consecutive years, faces similar constraints. 
 Chile from mid-1990 to the present has also sought fiscal restraint through an increase in 
the value added and corporate taxes and by moderating expenditures.  By substantially limiting 
public consumption, Malaysia also began to downsize its public sector during 1992.  In that 
year the overall public sector deficit shrank by about one percent of GDP to around 1.5 percent 
of GDP.  However, for most of the other capital-importing countries fiscal policy has not been 
a key tool in responding to rising capital inflows.  Indeed, many of the fiscal austerity 
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measures that were undertaken in a number of developing countries in the early 1990s were 
part of domestic inflation stabilization plans, privatization efforts, and/or adjustments 
associated with Fund programs that were begun at that time or already underway.  Examples of 
such consolidation efforts include Argentina, Mexico, and Sri Lanka. 
 Hence, because of lags and difficulties in initiating a policy change and because of its 
medium-term goals fiscal policy is not a particularly effective means of dealing with capital 
inflows, particularly if these are temporary and subject to abrupt changes.  There are also 
important asymmetries in using fiscal policy to deal with fluctuations in international capital 
flows.  In particular, while a fiscal tightening has been sometimes been suggested as a means 
of dealing with inflows, a loosening of fiscal policy would not be advocated to deal with 
outflows-- especially if the loose fiscal policy leads to a more accommodative monetary 
policy. 
 V. Capital Account Measures 
 
1.  Taxing short-term flows and prudential regulation 
 The above discussion suggests that one policy to directly reduce net inflows is the 
taxation of gross inflows, possibly in the form of a tax that falls more heavily on short-term 
inflows.  The policies adopted by Chile in 1991 and Colombia in 1993 (Table 1) fall in that 
category.  In both cases a nonremunerated reserve requirement is to be deposited at the Central 
Bank on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.  In the case of Colombia, 
the reserve requirement is to be maintained for the duration of the loan and applies to all loans 
with a maturity of five years or less, except for trade credit with a maturity of four months or 
less.  The percentage of the requirement declines as the maturity lengthens; from 140 percent 
for funds that are 30 days or less to 42.8 percent for five year funds.  For Chile, the tax is of the 
form of a nonremunerated 30 percent reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank 
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for a period of one year on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.  The 
tax rate for various maturities is summarized in Table 2 and highlights how such a measure 
may act as a disincentive to borrow abroad, particularly at short maturities--i.e., the tax is 
borne by the borrower.  In principle, because of their breadth, these measures affect the 
household sector, nonfinancial businesses, as well as the financial sector.  In practice, it has 
mainly served as deterrent for the banking system to borrow offshore.  
 More recently, Brazil has implemented a variety of taxes on inflows (Table 1), with 
greater variation across assets as well as across maturities.  As in the cases of Chile and 
Colombia, the tax on foreign issuance of bonds falls on the borrower.  However, some other 
taxes are paid by foreign lenders.  Notably, foreigners investing in the stock market have to 
pay a one percent tax upfront.xxiv  Hence the tax will fall more heavily on active investors 
which trade more often and hold stock for only relatively short periods of time and less heavily 
on more passive  "buy and hold" investors.  Hence, these measures are designed to target the 
speculative, "hot money" variety of capital inflows.  The tax to be paid by foreigners on fixed-
income investments has similar characteristics.   
 The main disadvantage with these measures is that flows are likely to be re-routed 
through other channels.  For example, over/under-invoicing of imports and exports since trade 
credits are exempt from the tax (see Mathieson and Suarez (1993)).  Others have argued that, 
in the case of Chile, over-invoicing of imports is not likely to be an attractive alternative since 
imports are taxed at a comparable rate (see Labán and Larraín (1993)).xxv  Indeed, inflows to 
Chile in 1991 were below those observed in 1990, possibly attesting to the success of this 
policy.  While net inflows increased, once again, in 1992 and beyond, the increases came 
primarily in foreign direct investment and other long term flows.  A similar pattern emerges in 
Colombia during 1994, with short-term flows accounting for a declining share of total flows; 
However, total inflows to Colombia continued to increase in 1994. 
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 In other instances, capital controls have been quantitative in nature (Table 1).  Measures 
implemented have included prudential limits, or prohibition, on non-trade related swap 
activities, offshore borrowing, and banks' net open market foreign exchange positions 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand), caps on banks' foreign currency liabilities 
(Mexico), or more blanket measures that prohibited domestic residents from selling short-term 
money-market instruments to foreigners (Malaysia). 
 In the case of Malaysia, a combination of wide domestic/foreign interest rate 
differentials and widespread expectation of an appreciation of the ringgit during the late 1993 
led to a surge in short-term capital inflows which culminated with the imposition of six 
measures to restrict inflows in January 1994 (Table 1).  The inflows came in the form of a 
marked rise in short-term bank deposits and were seen as speculative in nature.  Consequently, 
most of the measures were directed toward the control of the activities of the financial sector 
and most were announced to be temporary (see Aziz (1994) and Reinhart ans Smith (1996)).  It 
appears that the most successful of these measures in reducing short-term inflows, was that 
which prohibited domestic residents from selling short-term money-market instruments to 
foreigners; as the certificates of deposits (CDs) matured and could not be rolled over, short-
term inflows (and the monetary aggregates) began to shrink.  The combination of abandoning 
sterilization policies and the imposition of capital controls appear to have been successful in 
reducing domestic interest rates and short-term inflows.  However, as with taxation of inflows, 
if such policies are maintained indefinitely they will likely reduce the competitiveness and 
retard the development of the financial sector.xxvi  As far as the foreign investor is concerned, 
the cost of this measure (if any), was the foregone return from not being able to roll-over CDs. 
 However, this opportunity cost does not appear substantial since, as noted, in 1994 Malaysian 
short-term interest rates converged to world levels. 
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 In April 1992 Mexico passed a regulation that limited foreign currency liabilities of 
commercial banks to 10 percent of their total loan portfolio.  However, it is not clear to what 
extent this measure acted to reduce the size of the capital inflows, since banks' total loan 
portfolios had been expanding rapidly throughout that period and the initial share of loans in 
foreign currency was below the 10 percent limit.  For example, during 1992 bank assets grew 
by 41 percent while foreign currency loans grew by 88 percent; a similar pattern emerges in 
1993, with foreign currency loans increasing by 50 percent while total loans rose by 25.  
Indeed, the constraint only appears to have become binding in 1994 when total and foreign 
currency loans both rose by 27 percent. 
 Based on the recent experiences of these selected countries with policies directed toward 
curbing short-term capital inflows, two observations stand out.  First, reviewing the Chilean 
and Malaysian experience it appears that, at least in the short run, these two distinctly different 
policies were successful in reducing the volume of inflows in a relatively brief period of time.  
Hence, if the inflows are largely seen as a temporary phenomenon, such policies could be quite 
effective; the longer the inflows persist or the longer the policies remain in place, however, the 
greater the chances that the controls become less binding.  Second, it could be argued that the 
effect these policies had on the composition of flows (this also applies to Colombia) was the 
"desired" effect of lengthening maturities.  
2. Liberalizing capital outflows 
 A different approach to tempering the impact of large gross capital inflows has been to 
remove controls on capital outflows and thereby increase outflows which lowers net inflows.  
These policies have usually allowed domestic investors (notably, pension funds) to acquire 
foreign assets.  Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand are 
among those that have liberalized capital outflows (see Table 3).  This approach is less direct 
than taxation or controls on gross inflows for several reasons.  First, it assumes that the 
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existing controls on outflows were binding, a proposition that has been questioned by several 
studies (see Dooley (1995) for a review of this literature).  Second, it relies on the assumption 
that a greater ability by domestic residents to invest abroad will translate into greater 
investment abroad.  This may not occur if rate of return differentials favor markedly the 
domestic country.  Finally, it assumes that gross inflows will not be affected in a positive 
manner by the liberalization announcement. 
 This last assumption is potentially problematic.  It has been argued on both theoretical 
grounds and based on the evidence from a number of well-documented country cases (see 
Bartolini and Drazen (1994) and Labán and Larraín (1994)) that liberalization of outflows has 
actually induced heavier inflows.  Examples include: Italy and New Zealand in 1984, Spain in 
1986, Yugoslavia in 1990 and Chile in 1990s.  Lifting restrictions on capital outflows sends a 
"positive signal," increasing the confidence of the foreign investors and further stimulating 
capital inflows.  In addition, the effectiveness of this policy in inducing outflows may be 
further undermined if domestic interest rates are being kept high relative to international levels 
(say by sterilization polices), since domestic residents would not have an inducement to shift 
into foreign assets (even though it is now permissible).  Certainly, stock market returns in 
dollars during 1990-93 for several of the countries that liberalized (including Chile, Colombia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand) far exceeded the returns available in major industrial 
countries.  Lastly, given the massive capital flight that characterized the experience of many 
Latin American countries during most of the 1980s, it is not evident that, in many instances, 
such controls on outflows were particularly binding to begin with by the early 1990s. 
 
3.  Banking regulation and supervision 
 A major concern about the intermediation of international capital flows through the 
domestic banking system is that individual banks are subject to free or subsidized deposits' 
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insurance; i.e., there is an implicit commitment by the authorities that banks--especially those 
of large size--will not be allowed to fail.  It is well known that free implicit deposits' insurance 
induces banks to increase their risk exposure.  In several countries, there has been a sharp 
expansion of bank loans to finance private consumption.  There is evidence that in some of 
these countries the percentage of nonperforming loans has recently increased over time.  In 
addition, banks may play little attention to the matching of the maturities of deposits against 
those for loans--the formally being typically shorter than the latter.  Similarly, there could be a 
mismatch between the currency denomination of bank loans and the currency denomination of 
profits and incomes of the borrowing sector; e.g., consider the producer of a nontradable 
commodity borrowing in U.S. dollars to finance his activity.  All these factors increase the 
vulnerability of the financial system to reversals in capital flows--reversals that have the 
potential to end in financial crises.       
 It is the role of bank regulation and supervision to effectively diminish some of these 
risks.  As discussed earlier, attempting to insulate the banking system from short-term capital 
flows is a particularly important goal in cases where a substantial proportion of the inflows are 
in the form of short-term bank deposits.  Regulation that limits the exposure of banks to the 
volatility in equity and real estate markets could help insulate the banking system from the 
potential bubbles associated with sizable capital inflows.  In this vein, risk-based capital 
requirements in conjunction with adequate banking supervision to insure such requirements are 
complied with could help insulate the domestic banking system from the vagaries of capital 
flows. 
4.  Measures to discourage consumption 
 VI.  Policy Mix:  Some Lessons 
 A retrospective review of the policy response to the surge in capital inflows highlights 
the importance of how individual policies interact to either magnify or reduce the volume of 
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inflows, affect their composition, and/or alter their macroeconomic consequences.  For 
example, a combination of little or no short-term exchange rate uncertainty (as is the case 
when there is an implicit or explicit peg), sterilized intervention, which tends to prevent 
domestic short-term interest rates from converging toward international levels, and no binding 
impediments to capital inflows (through either taxation or quantitative constraints) is likely to 
maximize the volume of short-term capital inflows a country receives (this policy mix 
characterizes the Mexican experience during 1990-93 reasonably well, see Table 9).  The 
pairing of little or no short-term exchange rate risk and relatively high domestic interest rates 
favors the short-term investor; for the long-term investor, there is always exchange rate risk 
since over longer horizons the probability of a realignment of the peg or a change in the 
exchange rate regime increases.  Further, longer-term investments (such as foreign direct 
investment) tend to be less interest sensitive.  Hence, it would not be surprising to see that if 
such a policy mix remains in place for any extended period of time it may end up skewing the 
composition of inflows toward the short end of the maturity spectrum.   
 Similarly, it could be argued that the mix of sterilized intervention and controls on 
inflows may undermine the "individual effectiveness" of these policies.  The comparatively 
high interest rate differentials that usually accompany sterilization may act as an inducement to 
circumvent the capital controls (i.e. firms and banks may find ways of borrowing offshore).  
To the extent that they are successful in dodging the controls, this tends to offset some of the 
contractionary effects of the sterilization efforts.  Along the same lines, liberalizing controls on 
outflows as a policy aimed at reducing net capital inflows may backfire if domestic interest 
rates are high relative to international levels and/or if it is interpreted a positive signal of the 
future economic/policy environment.  Indeed, several countries (Chile, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, see Table 10) liberalized outflows while at the same time engaging in substantive 
sterilization efforts. 
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Table 1a.  Sterilization through Open Market Operations: Africa and Asia 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Egypt (1991) 
February, 1991-1994:  
Sterilization was done through open market sales of treasury bills. 
 
 Indonesia (1990) 
February, 1991:   
Significant monetary tightening.  Sales of SBIs increase sharply. 
March, 1991:   
State enterprises were instructed to convert Rp 10 trillion in bank deposits to Bank Indonesia certificates (SBIs).  
May, 1993:   
Monetary policy begins to ease and sterilization efforts diminish. 
 
 Kenya (1993) 
October, 1993-March, 1994:   
Large-scale sterilization through increased sales by the Central Bank of Kenya of treasury bills. 
 
 Korea (1992) 
April, 1993:   
Korea begins to sterilize through auctions of monetary stabilization bonds (MSB).  Previously open market 
operations consisted of a mandatory allocation scheme whereby the Bank of Korea allocated securities at 
controlled, below-market interest rates. 
 
 Malaysia (1989) 
1990:   
Central Bank begins to borrow in interbank market. 
1992:  
Heavy open market operations begin as the Central Bank steps up sales of Treasury bills and borrows heavily in 
the interbank market.   
February 10, 1993:   
Bank Negara begins to issue Bank Negara Bills (BNB), which are similar to Malaysian Government Treasury 
bills. This move was prompted by the need to have an instrument thorough which to conduct open market 
operations, since Treasuries issuance was dwindling in line with the shrinking government deficit.  During 
the first half of 1993 issuance is RM 9,300 billion during the second half issuance tapers off to RM 4,300 
billion. 
February 16, 1993:   
The central bank sells the first issues of the Malaysia Savings Bond MSB) RM 1 billion. 
 
 Philippines (1992) 
1992:  
Sterilization efforts intensify through issuance of Central Bank bills and borrowings under the Central Bank 
reverse repurchase facility.  Further, in view of the Central Bank's lack of holding of Treasury bills, the 
government was called to issue government securities and deposit the proceeds with the Central Bank. 
mid-1993:   
Sterilization efforts diminish and the government shifts its deposits out of the Central Bank to commercial banks. 
More adjustment comes through allowing the nominal exchange rate to appreciate. 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sources:  Alfiler (1994), Asea and Reinhart (1995), Aziz (1994), Banco de Mexico, Informe Anual 1993, Bank 
Negara Annual Report, various issues, Hettiarachi and Herat (1994), Nijathaworn and Dejthamrong (1994). 
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 








 Sri Lanka (1991) 
1991-92:   
Intense sterilization efforts through open market operations of Treasury bills. 
mid-1993:   
After depleting its holdings of Treasury bills, the Central Bank begins to issue paper in order to conduct open 
market operations.  Sterilization efforts moderate. 
 
 Thailand (1988) 
1989-91:   
Heavy sterilization period.  During this period the Bank of Thailand increases its rediscount rate from 8 percent at 
the end of 1989 to 12 percent at the end of 1990. 
late 1989:   
The Central Bank reduces commercial banks access to refinancing facilities.  The amount of refinancing was 
reduced from 100 percent to 50 percent of the face value of qualifying notes. 
Mid-1993:   
Sterilization efforts cease. 
 
 Uganda (1993) 
1993-April, 1994:   
Sterilization took place through central bank sales of treasury bill.  Due to insufficient new issues and the lack of 
a well-developed secondary market, it became increasingly difficult for the central bank to pursue 
sterilization policies for an extended period of time. 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sources:  Alfiler (1994), Asea and Reinhart (1995), Aziz (1994), Banco de Mexico, Informe Anual 1993, Bank 
Negara Annual Report, various issues, Hettiarachi and Herat (1994), Nijathaworn and Dejthamrong (1994). 
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 




Table 1b.  Sterilization through Open Market Operations: Latin America 
─────────────────────────────────────────────  
 Chile (1990) 
January 5, 1990:  
Large scale sterilization efforts begin with the Central Bank increasing its long-term real interest rate on its bonds 
from 6.9 percent to 9.7 percent and its 90-day paper from 6.8 to 8.7 percent.  
August 17, 1990:   
Short-term rates begin a moderate decline (from 8.7 to 8.2 percent).  
March 18, 1991:   
Further easing of policy with 90-day paper reaching 5.7 percent and 360-day paper declining from 9.2 to 5.9. 
April 2, 1992:   
Further easing with bond rate reduced from 9.7 percent to 6.6 percent. 
August 20, 1992:   
Policy begins to tighten with short-term rate rising to 5.7 percent. 
November 2, 1992:   
Further tightening with short-term rate rising to 6.5 percent and long-term rate rising to 7.7 percent. 
September, 1993:   
Yield curve becomes inverted with 10-year bond rate at 6.4 percent and short rates remaining at 6.5 percent. 
November 2, 1992:   
Further tightening 
 
 Colombia (1991) 
January, 1991:   
Heavy sterilization of inflows begins. 
October, 1991:   
Sterilization policies are abandoned. 
 
 Czech Republic (1992) 
August, 1994-March, 1995: 
Sterilization policies are conducted through heavy sales of government securities and central bank paper. 
 
 Mexico (1990) 
1990-1993:   




Sources:  Aziz (1994), Banco Central de Chile Memoria Anual, various issues, Banco Central de Chile, 
Evolucion de la Economia, various issues, Bank Negara Annual Report, various issues, Harinowo and Belchere 
(1994), Kang (1994), Laporan Mingguan Weekly Report, various issues. 
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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Table 2b.  Changes in Reserve Requirements: Eastern Europe and Latin America 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Argentina (1991) 
August 15, 1993:   
Reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency demand deposits were raised from 40 to 43 percent.  A 3 percent 
reserve requirement on domestic and foreign currency 30-89 day time deposits was introduced.  
 Brazil (1992) 
July 1, 1994:   
A 100 percent marginal reserve requirement on demand deposits and a 20 percent reserve requirement on time deposits is 
introduced.  Reserve requirements on saving deposits are raised from 10-15 percent to 20 percent. 
August 31, 1994:   
Reserve requirement on time and saving deposits are raised to 30 percent. 
December 6, 1994:  
A 15 percent reserve requirement on loans for the purchases of goods is introduced. 
April 28, 1995:   
Reserve requirement on time deposits is raised back from 27 percent to 30 percent.  The marginal reserve requirement on 
certificates of deposit is raised to 60 percent.  The reserve requirement on loans is raised from 6 percent to 18 percent. 
 Chile (1990) 
January, 1992:   
Nonremunerated 20 percent reserve requirement on deposits and loans in foreign currency held by commercial banks.  The 
reserve requirement must be maintained for one year. 
May, 1992:   
Reserve requirement on foreign currency deposits and loans held by commercial banks is increased to 30 percent.  The 
requirement was designed to make the tax rate fall as the maturity increases.  A 30 percent marginal reserve 
requirement is on interbank deposits is introduced. 
 Colombia (1991) 
January, 1991:   
Marginal reserve requirements of 100 percent were imposed on all new deposits.  These reserves were held as interest-bearing 
central bank bonds. 
September, 1991:   
The marginal reserve requirement was replaced by an increase in reserve requirements on most deposits. 
 Costa Rica (1991) 
October 1992:   
Reserve requirement on domestic currency demand deposits is raised from 30 to 34 percent, and those on time deposits from 
10 to 14 percent. 
 Czech Republic (1992) 
August, 1994:   
Reserve requirements were raised from 9 percent to 12 percent. 
 Mexico (1990) 
April, 1992:   
A compulsory liquidity coefficient for dollar liabilities was set at 15 percent.  This coefficient must be invested in liquid 
securities denominated in the same currency. 
 
──────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sources:  Aziz (1994), Banco Central de Chile Memoria Anual, various issues, Banco Central de Chile, 
Evolucion de la Economia, various issues, Bank Negara Annual Report, various issues, Gurria (1993), and 
Hettiarachi and Herat (1994),and Rodriguez (1991).  
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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 Table 2a.  Changes in Reserve Requirements: Africa and Asia 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Kenya (1992) 
October 1993-March 1994: 
Statutory cash ratio is increased in three steps from 12 percent to 20 percent. 
 Indonesia (1990) 
December 14, 1995:   
Commercial bank reserve requirement is raised from 2 percent to 3 percent. 
 Malaysia (1989) 
May 2, 1989:   
Reserve requirement is increased to 4.5 percent from 3.5 percent for commercial banks and 3.0 percent for finance companies. 
October 16, 1989:   
Reserve requirement is increased from 4.5 to 5.5 percent. 
January 16, 1990:   
Reserve requirement is increased from 5.5 to 6.5 percent. 
August 16, 1991:   
Reserve requirement is increased form 6.5 to 7.5 percent. 
September 16, 1991:   
All outstanding ringgit received through swap transactions with non-residents, including offshore banks, would be included in 
the eligible liabilities base and be subject to the statutory reserve requirements. 
May 2, 1992:   
Reserve requirement raised to from 7.5 to 8.5 percent.   
January 3, 1994:   
Reserve requirement increased from 8.5 to 9.5 percent.  The reserve requirement is extended to cover foreign currency 
deposits and transactions (such as foreign currency borrowing from foreign banking institutions and interbank 
borrowing).  Previously it had only applied to ringgit-denominated transactions. 
1994:   
Reserve requirement increased in two steps to 11.5 percent. 
February 1, 1996:   
Reserve requirement raised to 12.5 percent. 
 Philippines (1992) 
August 15, 1994:   
The reserve requirement is reduced from 20 percent to 17 percent with the objective of inducing a decline in interest rates. 
 Sri Lanka (1991) 
November 1, 1991:   
Reserve requirement raised to 13 percent. 
January 24, 1992:   
Reserve requirement raised to 14 percent from 13 percent. 
September 4, 1992:   
Reserve requirement extended to include foreign currency deposits. 
September 24, 1992:   
Reserve requirement lowered back to 13 percent. 
January 29, 1993:   
Reserve requirement raised 0.5 to 13.5 percent. 
April 16, 1993:   
Reserve requirement raised to 14 percent. 
May 21, 1993:   
Reserve requirement raised to 15 percent. 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
Source:  Hettiarachi and Herat (1994).  
Note:  The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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 Table 3.  Sterilization through Management of Government Funds 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Czech Republic (1992) 
December, 1994-February, 1995: 
Commercial bank deposits of the National Property Fund, amounting to about Kc 16 billion (or 10 percent of 
reserve money) were transferred to the Czech National Bank. 
May, 1995: 
An additional Kc 6 billion was transferred. 
 Malaysia (1989) 
April, 1990:   
The Money Market Operations (MMO) Account on the accountant general maintained at the Central Bank was 
reactivated.  Government deposits that were placed with the banking system maturing that year (about 
$3.7 billion) were withdrawn from the system and deposited in the MMO account. 
1992-94:   
Transfer of government and Employee Provident Fund (EPF) deposits to the central bank. 
 
 Philippines (1992) 
 




Savings of Central Provident Fund (CPF) are heavily invested in government bonds. 
 
 Taiwan Province of China 
 
Postal savings were transferred from the domestic banks to the central bank. 
 
 Thailand (1988) 
1987-mid-1992:   
Government deposits held at the Bank of Thailand increased from 25 percent of total deposits at the end of 1987 




Sources:   Aziz (1994), Bank Negara Annual Report, various issues, and Folkerts-Landau et. al. (1995).  
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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 Chile (1990) 
April, 1991:   
The band is revalued by 0.7 percent. 
May, 1991:   
The band is revalued by 0.7 percent. 
June, 1991:   
The band is revalued by 2 percent. 
January 23, 1992:   
The band is revalued by 5 percent. 
November 30, 1994:   
The band is revalued by 9.5 percent. 
 
 Colombia (1991) 
June, 1991:   
Nominal revaluation of 2.6 percent.  
January, 1994:   
The band is revalued by 5 percent. 
December, 1994:   




Sources:   Banco Central de Chile Memoria Anual, various issues, Banco Central de Chile, Evolucion de la 
Economia, various issues, Carrasquilla (1995), and Schadler et. al. (1993).  
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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 Table 6.  Increasing Exchange Rate Flexibility  
 
──────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Chile (1990) 
  January, 1992:   
The central parity is revalued by 5 percent and exchange rate band is widened from 10 percent to 20 percent, 
10 percent on each side. 
July, 1992:   
The exchange rate ceases to be pegged exclusively to the dollar and a peg to a basket of currencies (50 percent 
dollar, 30 percent deutsche mark, and 20 percent yen) is introduced. 
November 30, 1994:   
The central parity is revalued by 9.5 percent.  The weights of the currency basket are changed to 40 percent 
dollar, 35 percent deutsche mark, and 25 percent yen. 
 
 Colombia (1991) 
January 25, 1994:   
An exchange rate band is introduced.  The width of the band is 15 percent and the rate at which the band is to be 
devalued is equal to 11 percent per annum. 
 
 Czech Republic (1992) 
February 28, 1996: 
An exchange rate band is introduced; the width of the band is 15 percent.  
 
 Indonesia (1990) 
January, 1994:   
Intervention band widened from 10 to 20 rupiah. 
August, 1994:   
Intervention band widened from 20 to 30 rupiah. 
January 1, 1996:  
Intervention band widened from 2 percent to 3 percent. 
 
 Malaysia (1989) 
mid-1991:   
Greater degree of flotation allowed. 
 
 Mexico (1990) 
November 11, 1991:   
An exchange rate band is introduced.  The upper-limit of the band was depreciated at the rate of 20 cents a day 
and the floor remained fixed. Its total width increased from 1.2 percent in November 1991 to 4.3 percent 
in December 1992. 
   October, 1992:   
The rate of crawl of the upper limit is increased to 40 cents per day. 
The band width reached 8.7 percent by the end of 1993. 
 
 Philippines (1992) 
Mid-1992:   
Reduced foreign exchange intervention allowing for a nominal appreciation of the peso. 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sources:  Aziz (1994), Alfiler (1994), Carrasquilla (1995),  Harinowo and Belchere (1994), Gurria (1993), 
Helpman, Leiderman and Bufman (1995), and Schadler et al. (1993).  
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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 Table 8.  Fiscal Austerity Measures 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────                                                                           
 Chile (1990) 
1990-1994:   
Moderation of expenditure. Nonfinacial public sector surplus averages 2.5 percent during this period. 
Mid-1990:   
An increase in the value added tax rate to 18 percent.  An increase in the corporate tax to 15 percent, and an 
increase in the progressiveness of the personal income tax. 
 
 Malaysia (1989) 
19  1992-93:   
Fiscal consolidation.  Real public consumption growth reduced significantly (0.4 percent in 1992).  Public sector 
deficit reduced to about 1.5 percent of GDP. 
 
 Thailand (1988) 
1988-1991:   
Moderation of government expenditure.  Government budgetary balance (as a percent of GDP) swings from a 
deficit of 1.4 percent to a surplus of 4.9 percent in 1991. 
1992:   
Introduction of a value added tax. 
 
─────────────────────────────────────────────                                                                        
Sources:   Gonzalez (1995), Nijathaworn and Dejthamrong (1994), and Schadler et. al. (1993).  
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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   Table 9b.  Liberalization of Outflows: Latin America 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Chile (1990) 
April, 1990: 
New regulations liberalizing foreign exchange market operations.  Previously, all foreign exchange market 
operations prohibited unless under Central Bank's specific authorization.  New, all transactions permitted 
unless specifically restricted by Central Bank. 
1991: 
In a number of steps (February, April, May, and October), commercial banks were permitted to increase external 
trade financing and use up to 25 percent of foreign exchange time deposits for foreign trade financing.  
Joint venture rules were simplified, and the waiting period for remitting capital invested in Chile under the 
debt conversion program was shortened.  Procedures for enterprises to directly invest abroad were 
modified and made easier.  (These types of transactions were already done through the legal informal 
market.) 
March, 1992: 
a)Pension funds allowed to hold a portion of their portfolio in foreign assets (government bonds, certificates of 
deposit, and bankers' acceptances).  Limit on these investments increased gradually to 10 percent of 
investment portfolio. 
b)Limit on net foreign exchange holdings of commercial banks was doubled.  Share of export receipts exempt 
from surrender requirements increased.  Allocations of foreign exchange for a variety of payments abroad 
(including travel) raised.  Period for advance purchase of foreign exchange for debt service extended. 
 
 Colombia (1990) 
June, 1990: 
Ceiling applicable to foreign currency deposits held by domestic commercial banks increases to 15 percent (from 
8 percent). 
October 22, 1991: 
Liberalization of foreign investment regime (under Resolution 51) to expand existing guarantees and ease the way 
to new investment.  Foreign firms allowed to remit up to 100 percent of net annual profits. 
December, 1991: 
Investors permitted to buy up to 100 percent locally listed companies.  Abolition of restrictions on capital and 
income repatriation. 
February, 1992: 
a)Export surrender requirement proceeds eased:  all exporters allowed to retain part of export proceeds abroad.  
Previously, this was granted only to coffee growers and to state enterprises exporting oil and minerals. 
b)Residents allowed to hold foreign stocks and other foreign portfolio investments abroad up to $500,000.  
Higher amounts require approval of the National Planning Department. 
February, 1992: 
Minimum maturity on foreign loans reduced from five years with two years' grace, to one year.  Such loans 
permitted only to finance working capital or fixed investment.  Limit on contractual interest rate (London 




  Sources:  Conzalez (1995), Labán and Larraín (1994), and Schadler et al. (1993). 
  Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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 Table 9b (Continued).  Liberalization of Outflows: Latin America 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Colombia (continued) 
April, 1994: 
a)Limits on foreign investments of domestic pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds were raised 
from 3 to 4 percent. 
  
b)The share of export proceeds subject to surrender requirements was reduced from 90 to 85 percent and the 
period of surrender of foreign exchange was extended from 150 to 180 days. 
 
October, 1994: 
The share of export proceeds subject to surrender requirements was further reduced from 85 to 80 percent. 
 
 Mexico (1990) 
November, 1991: 
Abolished foreign exchange surrender requirements and related exchange control measures permitting unification 




  Sources:  Alfiler (1994), Banco de la Republica, Annual Report, various issues, Bank Negara, Annual Report, 
various issues, and Schadler et al. (1993). 
  Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 
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 Table 9a.  Liberalization of Outflows: Asia 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────── 
 Malaysia (1989) 
August, 1993: 
The minimum amount of equity that must be held by an indigenous Malay group, company or institution was 
lowered from 51% to 35%. 
 
 
 Philippines (1992) 
July, 1994: 
a)Bangko Central raised the limit on outward investments sourced from the banking system from US$1 million to 
US$3 million. 
b)Restrictions on repatriation of investments (and earning accruing therefrom) funded by debt-to-equity 
conversions under the old debt restructuring program are lifted. 
 
 
 Sri Lanka (1990) 
1993: 
Removal of limits on foreign currency working balances of commercial banks and a lower reserve ratio on 
foreign currency deposits to the extent that the funds were invested abroad. 
 
 Thailand (1988) 
April, 1991: 
Foreign exchange earners allowed to open foreign exchange accounts with commercial banks in Thailand up to 
$500,000 for individuals and $2 million for corporations.  Thai investors could freely transfer up to 
$5 million abroad for direct investment.  Bank of Thailand approval requirement of repatriation of 
investment funds eliminated. 
February, 1994: 
a)The amount of Thai baht that can be taken out to Vietnam and bordering countries was raised to B 500,000. 
b)The ceiling on the amount of foreign exchange that can be taken abroad for travelling expenses was eliminated 




  Sources:  Hettiarachchi and Herat (1994), Nijathaworn and Dejthamrong (1994), and Schadler et al. (1993). 
  Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows. 




i.  See Schadler et. al. (1993). 
ii.  Argentina is the only country in the recent inflow episode that did not attempt to sterilize 
any part of its foreign exchange market intervention. 
iii.  Indeed, the empirical evidence of the effectivess of sterilized intervention in industrial 
countries is mixed with some studies (Obstfeld (1990)) arguing intervention has not played an 
important role in currency realignments in recent years and others (Dominguez and Frankel 
(1993), for instance) concluding that it does.  See Taylor (1993) for a review of this literature. 
iv.  See Schadler et. al. (1993). 
v.  See Folkerts-Landau et. al. (1994)).  
vi.  Rodriguez (1992), suggests that the central bank losses associated with Colombia's 
sterilization efforts during 1991 amounted to 0.5-0.7 percent of GDP.  Kiguel and Leiderman 
(1993) indicate that during 1990 to mid-1992 Chile's central bank losses due to sterilization 
policies were about 1.4 percent of GDP.  Gurria (1993) estimates that the quasi-fiscal losses for 
Mexico were in the 0.2-0.4 percent per annum range during 1990-92.  Central bank losses in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka have also been nontrivial. 
vii.  In the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia other forms of sterilization, besides open market 
operations, were also being used during those periods.  These will be subsequently discussed. 
viii.  Banco de Mexico (1993). 
ix.  See Coorey (1992). 
x.  See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1994) and Folkerts-Landau et. al. (1994). 
xi.  See Reisen (1993) and Folkerts-Landau (1994). 
xii.  Quasi-fiscal costs are reduced or eliminated by transferring these costs to the government 
(i.e. by making them explicit fiscal costs). 
xiii.  See Hettiarachchi and Herat (1994) for Sri Lanka and Alfilier (1994) for the Philippines.  
The Colombian experience is detailed in Rodriguez (1991).  For a comprehensive study of the 
Indonesian case see Harinowo and Belchere (1994) while for Malaysian experience see Aziz 
(1994). 
xiv.  An indication of the evolution of country risk is given by the behavior of secondary market 
prices for loans, which were increasing sharply during these episodes (see Calvo, Leiderman, 
and Reinhart (1993)). 
  




xv.  Frankel (1994b), for instance, has suggested that expected devaluation can fully account for 
observed interest differentials.  However, his result would not be inconsistent with a steady-
state offset coefficient of unity. 
xvi.  This is consistent with Schadler's et. al (1993) findings.  
xvii.  The charts show for each of the countries (Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand) the composition of capital flows, split between total and short-term flows; 
differentials between interest rates on domestic deposits and U.S. Treasury bills, adjusted for 
actual exchange rate changes; and international reserves and exchange rates.  In the charts, a 
widening of interest rate differentials with international reserves rising and the exchange rate 
relatively steady would suggest that the authorities were at least partially sterilizing capital 
inflows. 
xviii.  The sharp rise in 1993 in short-term flows primarily reflected a reclassification of foreign 
loans from long-term to short-term flows when they were rebooked in the Bangkok offshore 
banking center after the center was opened. 
xix.  Of course, Chile introduced a tax on short-term flows in mid-1991, making it difficult to 
distinguish whether short-term flows decline as a result of the easing in monetary policy, the 
new capital control, or both. 
xx.  See Budnevich and Cifuentes (1993). 
xxi.  In the past two years, however, Korea's exchange rate policy has been characterized by 
massive exchange rate intervention in response to capital inflows. 
xxii.  On various aspects of exchange rate bands in Chile and Mexico, see Helpman, Leiderman, 
and Bufman (1993).  
xxiii.  See Reinhart and Smith (1995). 
xxiv.  This was eliminated on March 10, 1995, in order to encourage inflows on the wake of the 
Mexican crisis. 
xxv.  However, some circumvention of the tax is effected by reclassifying loans as trade-related. 
xxvi.  Malaysia removed most capital controls during the second half of 1994. 
